Family Institution and Filial Attention Contract by Jellal, Mohamed
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Family Institution and Filial Attention
Contract
Mohamed Jellal
Al Makrˆızˆı Institut d’Economie
3. October 2009
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17713/
MPRA Paper No. 17713, posted 8. October 2009 01:09 UTC
Al Makrîzî  Institut D’économie 
 
 
Family Institution and  
Filial Attention Contract 
 
 
Mohamed Jell llall  
 
 









In this paper, we examine the pure exchange motive for intergenerational transfers within the 
family. We consider a model where a selfish parent offers a financial transfer in exchange for 
the services of the child. Using a Stackelberg game, we study the optimal attention-money 
contract between the generations. We prove that the amount of gift received may be either 
positively or negatively related with the child's income. In addition, the relationship between 
the two variables is non linear and affected by the parent's degree of risk aversion. This non-
linearity, which has been largely neglected to date in empirical analyses, may explain why the 
exchange transfer motive has received little support in developed countries. 
JEL classification: D1; J1; J2 










 1 Introduction 
Since the pioneering work conducted by Becker (1991) on altruism within the family 
economists have been widely interested in the study of the motives for redistributive 
behaviors between generations. To date, the literature on private inter vivos transfers between 
parents and their children has differentiated two main strands regarding the motivation for 
such transfers (see Laferrère, 1999, Laferrère and Wolff, 2002). According to the altruistic 
hypothesis, parents derive satisfaction from the children's well-being. It follows that financial 
transfers are expected to flow from the least to the most financially needy generation, 
independently of any present or future reciprocating transfer (Becker, 1991). In the competing 
exchange model, financial transfers bestowed by parents correspond to a payment for non-
market services provided by children (Cox, 1987, Cox and Rank, 1992). In this framework of 
reciprocity, monetary transfers can be rendered later as part of a long-term contract, so that 
parents can extract a greater amount of attention from their children (Bernheim et alii, 1985). 
In another exchange model, transfers are familial loans between non-altruistic family 
members. Parents _rst help their liquidity-constrained children early in the life-cycle, and then 
are paid back during their old-age years (Cox, 1990, Cigno, 1993). 
The empirical exploration of motives for family transfers matters for the effectiveness of 
public safety nets, since the effects of public income redistribution depend in part on private 
responses to them and especially on family assistance decisions. Different outcomes for 
public policies that redistribute income are expected under altruism and under exchange. On 
the one hand, households responding to altruistic feelings will completely neutralize the 
effects of a government redistribution by perfectly adjusting the level of their family 
assistance, at least when there exists interior solutions for such private transfers (Barro, 1974) 
(Hence, attempts by a central autority to affect the distribution of intergenerational resources 
through welfare programs are doomed to failure with benevolent transfers.) 
On the other hand, under exchange motives, a  public income redistribution is not necessarily 
neutralized by modifications of family transfers. For instance, Cox  and Jakubson (1995) 
demonstrate that the redistributional effects of a welfare program can be reinforced by such 
private exchange-motivated transfers. 
 
       Thus, the question worth related to the altruism neutrality result is whether one can 
distinguish from an empirical viewpoint between the two competing motives for inter vivos 
transfers inside the family. An answer to this interrogation may be found in the pioneering 
paper of Cox (1987), who was the first to introduce a unified model of private assistance 
carrying either altruism or exchange motives. These two regimes yield a different prediction 
about the effect of the recipient's income on transfers, and this testable restriction can 
determine which theoretical hypothesis is consistent with the data. Under altruism, the amount 
bestowed is expected to decrease in response to the child's higher income. But in the case of 
an exchange, the effect of the child's income cannot be signed since it strongly depends on the 
elasticities of supply and demand for services (Cox, 1987) .When the demand of services 
from children is inelastic, the gift value is expected to rise with the child's level income (Cox 
and Rank, 1992). Parents have then to pay a higher price to get the same amount of attention 
from their children   .So, while a positive relationship between the child's income and the gift 
value holds only under exchange, a negative relationship reveals itself little about transfer 
motives since it consistent both with altruism and exchange. 
Recently, two criticisms have stressed the inability to infer the main motives behind inter-
vivos transfers from this previous empirical test. First, Stark and Falk (1998) propose a model 
where financial gifts directly affect preferences through a recipient's empathy function. In 
this setting, a child's lower income may be positively correlated with an exchange transfer 
and hence the altruism and exchange hypotheses can give rise to behaviors that can be 
observationally equivalent. Second, Altonji et alii (1997) demonstrate that the gift value can 
be positively correlated with a child's higher income even under altruistic feelings. 
Indeed, the distribution of the altruism parameter has to be taken into account, since it 
influences the existence of positive gifts (interior solutions). In particular, a parent has to 
be comparatively more altruistic to transfer resources to a richer offspring, thus leading 
to an increase in the gift value. 
 
        Then, Altonji et alii (1997) suggest a different way to test which behavior is consistent 
with the data. In the altruism model, a change in the distribution of income between the 
generations does not affect the optimal levels of consumptions. This well-known result, which 
is called the income-pooling property, yealds the following test corresponding to a unitary 
difference in transfer income derivatives. Conditional on positive transfers, offsetting a given 
change in both the child's and parent's income is completely neutralized by a same change in 
the transfer value given by the parent to the child (Altonji et alii, 1997, Cox, 1987). 
Nevertheless, this test of intra-familial neutrality is only able to provide support for the 
relevance of the altruism model. When the difference in transfer income derivatives is not 
equal to one, the test conveys in itself no information about the possibility of exchange-
motivated transfers. 
 
       A more subtle and insightful approach to test the motives for transfers inside the family 
has recently been followed by Cox et alii (1998, 2000). Using a model that nests the beckerian 
altruism hypothesis, Cox et alii (2000) show that substantial non-linearities are likely to occur 
between the child's income and the amount of financial transfer from parent. This relationship 
between the two variables arises because either altruistic or exchange assistance can 
predominate depending on the recipient's level of resources. As the child's income rises to a 
certain threshold, the regime of transfer motive is expected to switch from altruism to 
exchange. This test is much informative since it suggests that one or the other motive may be 
more appropriate to characterize the behavior of particular families. Even in the exchange 
regime, Cox et alii (1998) prove using a Nash bargaining model that transfers can _rst rise, 
then fall with the recipient's pre-transfer income.This result occurs because an increase in the 
child's income also leads to a rise of the recipient's threat-point utility, defined by his well-
being with no exchange ). Hence, from an empirical viewpoint, one should account for a non-
linear specification in the recipient's income concerning the transfer function. 
 
      In this paper, we attempt to go one step further by examining in greater detail this 
relationship between the two key variables associated with the transfer hypotheses, i.e.the 
recipient's income and the gift value. We use a model of transfers relying on an exchange 
motive which is observationally equivalent to the one proposed by Cox (1987): the child 
provides services and the parent buys this attention. However, in contrast with the previous 
literature, we focus on a pure exchange model in which parents derive no satisfaction from the 
well-being of their children. The situation is like a Stackelberg game since the parent just 
wants the child to participate in the exchange contract, where the willingness to supply 
services depends on the financial payment. We provide a theoretical characterization of the 
filial attention contract. Our theoretical analysis puts forward the role of the parental degree of 
risk aversion when explaining family transfers, since this parameter influences the 
relationship between the child's income and the gift value. 
 
       The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce a pure 
exchange model of transfer where a selfish parent buys the services of the child. We describe 
the corresponding Stackelberg game in which the parent is a dominant player. 
In section 3, we study the optimal pattern of intergenerational transfers. We derive the 
solutions for the two transfers currencies, services and money, and focus on the issues of non-
linearity and risk-aversion. In section 4, we present some concluding remarks dealing with 
empirical considerations for transfer behavior. 
 
2 A Pure Exchange Model of Transfer 
Let us consider a model of family transfer whose motives correspond to a pure exchange 
between two generations. The underlying mechanism of reciprocity is organized as follows 
(see Cox, 1987). Children provide services and attention to their parents, and the latter buy 
these services by giving them some money .In an inter temporal framework, transfers may 
also be seen as loans between the generations (Cox,1990). Parents are expected to grant loans 
to their children and are reimbursed latter by financial transfers. The two variants (static and 
dynamic) of the exchange model are observationally equivalent as long as the repayment from 
children occurs through filial attention. 
        Following Cox (1996), we suppose that the family exchange involves time-related 
transfers that have no close substitutes on the market. An interpretation is that parents attach 
an important emotional value specific to the amount of attention received from their own 
children (Lafferère, 1999). We use a two-generational setting where each generation is 
represented by only one person. For the presentation, the parent and the child are respectively 
denoted by subscript 𝑝 and 𝑘. The model includes two currencies of transfers, money 𝑇 which 
is given by the parent to the child and attention 𝐴 which flows from the child to the parent. In 
contrast with the model of Cox (1987) and Cox et alii (1998), the parent is purely selfish and 
he does not care for the well-being of the child. Cigno (1993, 2002) also examines a non-
altruistic model of transfer, where family acts as a substitute or a complement to the credit 
market and transfers are a means of improving the inter temporal allocation of resources. 
However, the mechanism is different from the exchange that we present. Transfers are no 
longer a substitute for private consumption, but they are instead a form of investment 
(transfers are like a portfolio choice operation. This implies that his level of satisfaction is an 
increasing function of his own consumption 𝐶𝑝  and of the amount of upstream services 𝐴 
received from the child. Without loss of generality, we restrict our analysis to the case of 
separable utility functions. Thus, the utility function 𝑈 for the parent can be expressed as:  
                     𝑈 = 𝑢 𝐶𝑝 +   𝜙 𝐴                                                                                      (1) 
where 𝑢 and 𝜙 are utility functions defined respectively over personal consumption and 
attention. We make the standard assumptions that the two utility 𝑢 and 𝜙 are continuous , two 
times differentiable and strictly quasi-concave. This implies that we have 𝑢′ > 0,𝑢′′ < 0, and 
𝜙′ > 0,𝜙" < 0 with the normalization 𝑢 0 = 0. Concerning the budget constraint, we 
suppose that the parent is characterized by an exogenous level of income 𝑌𝑝 . The parental 
revenue is devoted to the personal consumption 𝐶𝑝  and to the provision of a selfish financial 
gift 𝑇 to the child (𝑇 ≥ 0). Therefore, the budget constraint is simply given by  𝐶𝑝 = 𝑌𝑝 − 𝑇 . 
 
        We now turn to the situation to the child, which may either accept or reject the filial 
attention contract. When the child decides to refuse the exchange contract proposed by the 
parent, for instance because the financial counterpart is not high enough, the child devotes all 
his time on the labor market. If we denote by 𝑤 is the child's market wage and by 𝑕 the work 
time for a salary job, the child's income is given by 𝑤𝑕. This amount of resources is affected 
to the child's consumption Ck, so that the budget constraint is 𝐶𝑘 = 𝑤𝑕 . Let 𝑣(. ) be the 
child's utility function which is defined over the consumption 𝐶𝑘 = 𝑤𝑕 , where 𝑣(. ) is 
continuous and strictly quasi-concave  𝑣 ′ > 0, 𝑣" < 0 .  The level of satisfaction V0 when 
the child chooses not to spare time with his parent may be expressed as: 
                   𝑉0 = 𝑣 𝑤𝑕                                                                                                       (2) 
What happens when the child accepts the parental the familial contract ? In this situation, the 
child is expected to receive two types of financial resources. First, the child still receives an 
income on the labor market. However, the provision of upstream services decreases the 
amount of time that the child can devote to the job market. Thus, the salary income is 
lowered. In addition, it is more expensive for the child to visit his parent when the two 
generations are distant. Several studies have shown that the child's supply of services is 
strongly affected by the geographical distance to the parent (see Hiedemann and Stern, 1999, 
Sloan et alii, 1997, Wolff, 2001. Let 𝑥 be a variable that indicates the distance between the 
two generations. We suppose that the opportunity cost related to the wage loss involved by 
the provision of attention is proportional to the distance from the parent. It follows that the 
earned income of a child who accepts to care for the parent given by 𝑤 𝑕 −  1 + 𝑥 𝐴  
Second, the parent is expected to make a financial transfer to compensate for the loss in the 
child's level of income. The gift value 𝑇 is an increasing function of the volume of upstream 
services. The budget constraint is now   𝐶𝑘 = 𝑇 + 𝑤 𝑕 −  1 + 𝑥 𝐴 . So, the child's level of 
satisfaction V1 when attention is bought by the parent becomes: 
𝑉1 = 𝑣 𝑇 + 𝑤 𝑕 −  1 + 𝑥 𝐴                                                                       (3) 
In our framework, the supply of upstream attention basically depends on the opportunity cost 
for the child's time. Let 𝑐 = 𝑤 1 + 𝑥  be a variable corresponding to the time value for the 
recipient's child. The two components of this opportunity cost are the wage rate 𝑤 which 
indicates the capacities of the agents on the labor market and the geographical distance 𝑥.  
The implicit cost related to the supply of services is all the more low as the child is badly paid 
in the labor market and/or lives near his parent. These two variables are supposed to belong to 
closed intervals, so that we can write 𝑤 ∈  0,𝑤   and 𝑥 ∈  0, 𝑥 . Given these two restrictions, 
the opportunity cost c also belongs to the closed interval 𝑐 ∈  0, 𝑐 . Hence, a child faces a 
specific time value c and the supply of upstream services is subordinated to this cost 
heterogeneity. 
We can now characterize the optimal intergenerational contract. We first define the rules of 
the game and then present the corresponding maximization program. 
Definition 1  
The optimal family contract is such that: 
i) the parent sets the transfers (𝑇,𝐴) of the contract and the child plays according to this 
transfer rule ; 
ii) the child accepts the contract if and only if  𝑉 ≥ 0, where 𝑉 is the rent obtained by the 
child when he takes part in the family contract. 
Thus, in the context of our model, the situation is like a Stackelberg game in which the parent 
is the dominant player. The parent is absolutely not concerned with the child's utility, he just 
wants the child to participate in the exchange contract provided that the willingness to supply 
𝐴 depends on 𝑇. Clearly, the parent sets the rule and the child plays according to them. From 
the child's perspective, we assume that the familial exchange contract is desirable if and only 
if the following condition holds: 
      𝑉 = 𝑉1 − 𝑉0                                                                                       (4) 
which corresponds to the individual rationality constraint for the child. The rent for the child 
is simply the difference between the child's levels of well-being according to whether he 
accepts or not the money-services exchange. It is in the interest of the child to accept the 
family contract only when the parent proposes a sufficiently high remuneration to compensate 
the child for his disutility (When the compensation for the wage loss is sufficiently raised by 
the gift value, the child derives satisfaction from the money-exchange reciprocity). 
Therefore,  the problem for the child is given by the following program: 
max𝐴≥0 𝑉 = 𝑣 𝑇 𝐴 + 𝑤𝑕 − 𝑐𝐴 − 𝑣 𝑤𝑕                                                           (5) 
The solution of this maximization program gives some kind of a reaction function for the 
child. Now, the problem for the parent is to maximize his utility function 𝑈 given the 
individual rationality constraint of the child. Hence, in this Stackelberg game, the optimal 
family contract is solution of: 
max𝐴,𝑉    𝑈 =   𝑢 𝐶𝑝 + 𝜙 𝐴                                                                                      (6) 
s.t      𝑉 ≥ 0 , 0 ≤ 𝐴 ≤ 𝑕 
It is important to note that in our setting, the parent receives no utility from the child's rent 
when taking part in the family contract. The Stackelberg equilibrium gives solutions for the 
two currencies 𝐴 and 𝑇 at the same time: the child plays according to the rules set by the 
parent. Again, there is in effect no altruism involved. In the case of effective altruism, the 
utility function 𝑈 for the parent would be instead 𝑈 = 𝑢 𝐶𝑝 + 𝜙 𝐴 + 𝛽𝑉1, where the 
parameter 𝛽 ∈  0,1 [ indicates the degree of parental benevolence. Such an expression would 
be similar to the utility function in Cox (1987), and then it would be appropriate to separate 
the money and services decisions ( in presence of altruism, one gets more complicated results, 
where the parent transfers more to the poor child than motivated by the level of attention. ) 
 
3 The Optimal Family Contract 
To find the optimal solutions for the family contract, we consider a setting of perfect 
information between the two generations. This implies that the parent knows with certainty 
the value of his child opportunity cost 𝑐 = 𝑐(𝑤, 𝑥). The parent is perfectly aware of his child's 
geographical location and of the wage rate on the labor market. We also make an additional 
assumption concerning the supply of services. 
Assumption 1 The condition 
𝜙′
𝑢′




  and 𝑢′ =
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝐴
 .Clearly,   
𝜙′
𝑢′
 is the marginal rate of substitution between private 
consumption (or financial transfer) and services. The interpretation of this assumption is that 
there exist some children whose opportunity cost is so high that it appears too costly and not 
very desirable for the parent to make them take part in the family exchange. For example, a 
child who is remunerated at a very high wage rate and who lives far away will not provide 
attention to his parent. Thus, his supply of upstream services is expected to be null. We first 
calculate the optimal solutions for 𝐴 and 𝑇, and then examine how the gift value 𝑇 depends on 
the child's income. 
 
3.1 The Pattern of Intergenerational Transfers 
 Since the parent is perfectly aware of the child's opportunity cost and given the Stackelberg 
equilibrium for the game, the family contract of exchange consists in determining jointly the 
supply of services by the child and the amount of financial transfer devoted to the purchase of 
this attention. 
Proposition 1  
The optimal allocation of transfers for the family contract is such that: 
i) 𝐴 𝑐 =  
𝑕               𝑓𝑜𝑟   0 ≤ 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐1
𝛷−1 𝑐       𝑓𝑜𝑟   𝑐1 ≤ 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐2 
0             𝑓𝑜𝑟   𝑐2 ≤ 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐 
  
ii) 𝑇 𝑐 =  
𝑐𝑕           𝑓𝑜𝑟    0 ≤ 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐1
𝑐𝐴 𝑐       𝑓𝑜𝑟    𝑐1 ≤ 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐2
0           𝑓𝑜𝑟   𝑐2 ≤ 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐 
  
with   𝛷 =
𝜙′
𝑢′
 , 𝑐1 = 𝛷(𝑕) and 𝑐2 = 𝛷(0).  
Proof :  
Let us first solve the maximization problem (5) for the child. From the corresponding first-
order condition :   𝑇 ′ 𝑐 − 𝑐 𝑣′ 𝑇 𝐴 + 𝑤𝑕 − 𝑐𝐴 = 0 ,we deduce that the optimal financial 
transfer satisfies 𝑇 ′ 𝑐𝐴 = 𝑐, which is the reaction function for the child. Since 𝑇 𝐴 = 0 =
0, it follows that : 𝑇 𝐴 = 𝑐𝐴(𝑐). Hence, from the definition of the rent 𝑉 = 𝑣 𝑇 𝐴 + 𝑤𝑕 −
𝑐𝐴 − 𝑣 𝑤𝑕 , we obtain that the rent for the child is such that 𝑉 = 0 at the equilibrium. To 
take part in the family exchange does not affect the child's well-being. 
 
        Now, for the parent, the problem is to maximize the selfish utility 𝑈 subject to the 
constraint 𝑉 = 0 since the parent is the dominant player. Thus, the Lagrangian of the parental 
maximization program is: 
ℒ = 𝑢 𝐶𝑝 +   𝜙 𝐴 + 𝜆𝑉  where the inequalities 𝑉 ≥ 0 , 0 ≤ 𝐴(𝑐) ≤ 𝑕 and 𝜆 > 0 hold. 
Using  𝐶𝑝 = 𝑌𝑝 − 𝑇 , 𝑇 𝐴 = 𝑐𝐴(𝑐)  and 𝑉 = 0, the solution for the parent is to maximize  
𝑈 = 𝑢 𝑌𝑝 − 𝑐𝐴(𝑐) + 𝜙 𝐴(𝑐) . From the first-order condition for an interior solution, we 
get: −𝑐𝑢
  
′  𝑌𝑝 − 𝑐𝐴(𝑐) + 𝜙
′ 𝐴(𝑐) = 0 which can also be expressed as : 
𝜙 ′  𝐴(𝑐) 
𝑢
  
′  𝑌𝑝−𝑐𝐴(𝑐) 
= 𝑐.Let 
Φ(𝐴) be the function such that Φ 𝐴 =
𝜙 ′  𝐴(𝑐) 
𝑢
  
′  𝑌𝑝−𝑐𝐴(𝑐) 
 . Then, the optimal level of services 
satisfies Φ 𝐴 𝑐  = 𝑐  and hence 𝐴 𝑐 = Φ−1(𝑐).By differentiating with respect to c the 
following quantity    
𝜙 ′  𝐴(𝑐) 
𝑢
  
′  𝑌𝑝−𝑐𝐴(𝑐) 




Clearly, the sign of 𝐴′(𝑐) is negative from the concavity of 𝑢 and 𝜙. 
By definition, we have 𝑐 ∈  0, 𝑐 . For 𝑐 = 0 we have: 𝜕ℒ 𝜕𝐴 = 𝜙′ 𝐴 0  > 0 which implies 
 𝐴 0 = 𝑕. Since 𝐴′ 𝑐 < 0, one can find a value 𝑐1 such that Φ 𝑕 = 𝑐1.In the same way, the 
inequality Φ 0 < holds from assumption 1 and thus there exists a cost level 𝑐2such that 
𝑐2 = Φ
′(0). Finally, using 𝑇(𝐴𝑐)) = 𝑐𝐴(𝑐)) from the child's reaction function, we find the 
different optimal financial transfers. QED 
Let us interpret this proposition. One can distinguish three regimes of assistance for the child's 
supply of services. 
        When the child is characterized by a low value for his opportunity cost c, whether his 
wage rate remains low or he leaves near his kin, the parent asks the child to allocate the 
maximum of his time to the provision for upstream transfers. For 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐1, the level of attention 
is thus 𝐴 𝑐 = 𝑕. Given the concavity of u, the corresponding cost level c1 is all the more low 
as the variable h is high. With many children, this first regime where c ∈  0, c1  implies that 
the same volume of services is expected from the children. The latter are then compensated 
for their attention by the same amount of financial assistance, so that there may exist equal 
sharing in an exchange model of family transfers. 
        For intermediate values for the opportunity cost such that 𝑐 ∈  𝑐1, 𝑐2 , the parent expects 
a specific level of attention from his child in accordance with the time value c. Since the 
condition 𝐴′ 𝑐 < 0 holds for 𝑐 ∈  𝑐1, 𝑐2 , a child with an increased opportunity cost (because 
of a higher wage rate or a greater geographical distance) will be comparatively less appealed 
by the parent.  
When the child faces a very high value for his opportunity cost (high wage rate and/or 
geographical distance), the parent does not wish to receive upstream time related transfers. 
Indeed, the gift value related to the purchase of the child's attention would be too expensive 
for the parent, so that 𝐴 𝑐 = 0    for 𝑐 ≥ 𝑐2. 
 It seems important to note that the design of our theoretical framework is very closed to the 
one proposed by Cox (1987), but within a different framework. Cox (1987) assumes that the 
child accepts to take part in a money-services exchange only if his level of satisfaction is not 
lowered. Thus, there is an additional constraint given by the difference between the child's 
level of utility with transfers and the child's threat point defined when no exchange takes 
place. Another way to model the exchange model is to consider a Nash equilibrium, which 
leads to an increase in satisfaction for the two generations (see Cox, 1987, Cox and Rank, 
1992). This utility constraint leads to  two regimes of motives. When the child's constraint is 
not binding, transfers are relevant from altruism. But when the child's constraint is binding, 
the marginal gift amount does not equalize the marginal utilities of consumptions between the 
two generations and the transfers are only motivated by an exchange between money and 
services. Relying on a Stackelberg equilibrium as we do in our model of reciprocity leads to a 
similar conclusion, since the child has the same utility level whether he participates in the 
exchange or not. 
 
3.2 Financial Transfer and Parental Risk Aversion 
Given the previous levels of attention, the parent is involved to propose a compensation to 
the child using a financial transfer. According to the optimal filial attention contract, we find 
that the gift value is defined as the product of the amount of attention and the price of services 
which corresponds to the value of the child's opportunity cost . In the exchange model of Cox 
(1987), the financial gift may also be expressed as the product of services and an implicit 
average price of services in the exchange regime . It follows that the optimal provision of 
financial gift is a piecewise function of the amount of services. 
 
       Given the profile of gift value 𝑇 which is a function of the type of child 𝑐 ∈  0, 𝑐 ], we 
can study how the child's opportunity cost 𝑐 = 𝑐(𝑕, 𝑥)  affects the optimal transfer amount. 
Indeed, one has to remind that the empirical tests carried out to find the motive for transfer 
behaviors inside the households depends on the relationship between the child's income and 
the amount of financial gift bestowed by the parent. We now indicate how the parent's degree 




Proposition 2  
The optimal amount of parental  financial gift is affected by the child's opportunity 
cost in the following way : 
i)  for     0 ≤ 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐1 ,    𝑠𝑔𝑛 𝑇
′ 𝑐 > 0 
ii) for   𝑐1 ≤ 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐2   ,   𝑠𝑔𝑛 𝑇
′ 𝑐 = 𝑠𝑔𝑛  𝜎𝑟 − 1  
where    𝜎𝑟 =  
−𝐴𝛷 ′ (𝐴)
𝛷(𝐴)
       indicates the parental degree of relative risk aversion. 
Proof  
The sign of 𝑇 ′ 𝑐 > 0  0 depends on the value of c. First, when the condition 0 ≤ 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐1  
holds, the transfer is 𝑇 𝑐 = 𝑐𝑕. We obtain 𝑇 ′ 𝑐 = 𝑕 and hence the derivative is positive. 
Second, for 𝑐1 ≤ 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐2, the gift value is defined by 𝑇 𝑐 = 𝑐𝐴(𝑐). Hence, the derivative 
T0(c) may be calculated as :          𝑇 ′ 𝑐 = 𝐴 𝑐 + 𝑐𝐴′(𝑐) 
From the fist-order condition we know that the equality  −𝑐𝑢
  
′  𝑌𝑝 − 𝑐𝐴(𝑐) + 𝜙
′ 𝐴(𝑐) = 0 
holds. Using the function  Φ 𝐴 =
𝜙 ′  𝐴(𝑐) 
𝑢
  
′  𝑌𝑝−𝑐𝐴(𝑐) 
 , it can also be expressed as  Φ 𝐴(𝑐) = 𝑐. By  
differentiation, we find that 𝐴′ 𝑐 Φ′ 𝐴 𝑐  = 1 ,   which implies that 𝐴′ 𝑐 =
1
Φ ′ (𝐴 𝑐 )
  . 




𝑠𝑔𝑛 (𝐴 𝑐  1 −
1
𝜎𝑟
 )  ,   where  𝜎𝑟 =  
−𝐴Φ ′ (𝐴)
Φ(𝐴)
   . 
Thus, we have  𝑇 ′ 𝑐 > 0   (respectively 𝑇 ′ 𝑐 < 0) when the condition 𝜎𝑟 =  
−𝐴Φ ′ (𝐴)
Φ(𝐴)
 > 1 
(respectively 𝜎𝑟  < 1) holds for the parental degree of relative risk aversion. QED 
 
        Let us interpret this result, which indicates the existence of different effects for the 
child's income according to value of c considered. For a child with a low opportunity cost, the 
parent proposes a transfer comparatively more favorable for a wealthy child since one has 
𝑇 ′(𝑐) > 0. Indeed, the transfer is an increasing function of the opportunity cost, which is itself 
positively correlated with the level of income w for the child. In other words, for  0 ≤ 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐1, 
a child devotes the totality of his time to care for the parent and he receives in return a higher 
gift value when he earns a high wage rate on the job market. This anti compensatory effect of 
intergenerational family redistribution has been put forward as the main characteristic of the 
money-services exchange model (Cox, 1987, Cox and Rank, 1992). 
 
         However, in the second regime where  𝑐1 ≤ 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐2, the effect of the recipient's income 
basically depends on the degree of relative risk aversion for the parent. The justification of 
this result is due to the fact that the volume of services made by the child varies according 
to his opportunity cost. So, the full cost for a parent to buy the child's attention is 𝑇 𝐴(𝑐) =
Φ A c  A(c)  with 𝑐 = Φ 𝐴(𝑐) , i.e. the product of the unit price of attention and the 
quantity of upstream services A(c). Consequently, the derivative 𝑇 ′(𝐴 𝑐 ) is as follows : 
𝑇 ′(𝐴(𝑐)) = Φ 𝐴 𝑐  + 𝐴(𝑐)Φ′ 𝐴 𝑐   




Thus, the impact of the supply of services on the financial transfer clearly depends on the 
parental measure for relative risk aversion. We have to examine the two following cases : 
First, when the parent has a low value for risk aversion  (𝜎𝑟 < 1) , he agrees to pay a higher 
gift value to receive more attention from his child since 𝑇 ′ 𝑐 > 0. But we have previously 
shown that an increased supply of services could only emanate from a child characterized by a 
low opportunity cost  𝐴′ 𝑐 < 0. Thus, for 𝜎𝑟 < 1, one fins a negative derivative 𝑇
′ 𝑐 < 0. 
A parent is expected to transfer more financial resources to his child when the latter earns a 
low income. This compensatory redistribution of resources between the generations does not 
result here from altruistic motivations, but it is explained by the lower parental risk aversion.  
Second, when the parent is characterized by a high value for risk aversion (𝜎𝑟 > 1), the 
condition 𝑇 ′ 𝐴(𝑐) < 0 holds. The parent is expected to receive a low volume of upstream 
services. Such a limited attention is necessarily provided by a child with a high opportunity 
cost, whether his wage on the labor market is high or he lives far away from the parent. Thus, 
for 𝜎𝑟  > 1, the derivative 𝑇
′(𝑐) is positive and the parent seeks to offer a greater 
compensation for a richer child. Therefore, this theoretical framework of filial contract puts 
forward an essential characteristic of the exchange-motivated model. The relationship 
between the amount of financial transfer to the child and the volume of services received in 
return is largely nonlinear. In the case of a parent having a preference for risky behavior, one 
always expects Anti compensatory effects for the redistribution of resources between the 
generations. A richer child receives a greater amount of financial gift from the parent. 
Conversely, in the probable case where the relative dislikes risky attitudes, the amount of 
financial transfer is first an increasing function of the child's income for a low value of 
opportunity cost, but it is then a decreasing function as one considers intermediate levels of 
opportunity cost for the child. Hence, one expects an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
the child's income and the gift value for a risk-averse parent. 
 
        Finally, in the intermediary regime (𝑐1 ≤ 𝑐 ≤ 𝑐2), we can easily prove that the parental 
income exerts a positive impact on the gift value to the child, which is a standard result in 
exchange models. Using 𝑇 𝑐 = 𝑐𝐴(𝑐), we deduce that  𝜕𝑇 𝜕𝑌𝑝
 = 𝑐 𝜕𝐴 𝜕𝑌𝑝
 . Now, from the 
first-order condition  : −𝑐𝑢
  
′  𝑌𝑝 − 𝑐𝐴(𝑐) + 𝜙
′ 𝐴(𝑐) = 0, it follows that   𝑠𝑔𝑛 𝜕𝐴 𝜕𝑌𝑝
 =
𝑠𝑔𝑛 (−𝑐𝑢") > 0  . This derivative is clearly positive given the concavity of 𝑢(. ). Thus, while 
the gift value may either increase or decrease with the child's income depending on the 
parental risk aversion, the exchange model predicts that a richer parent always offers a greater 
compensation for the services received from the child. 
 
 
4 Conclusion  
 In this paper, we have developed a model of exchange-motivated transfers between a parent 
and a child using a Stackelberg game. There is no utility gain for the child when entering into 
the transfer-services arrangement , and the financial gift provides perfect compensation for the 
child's attention. Each child is characterized by an opportunity cost for his time value. 
Looking at the optimal exchange contract, we prove that both types of transfers are likely to 
follow a non-linear pattern. The gift value from parent may be positively or negatively related 
with the child's level of income, depending on the parent's degree of risk aversion. When the 
parent is risk-lover, a positive relationship between the recipient's income and the transfer 
amount is always expected. But when the parent is risk-averse, the gift value is expected to 
first rise, then fall at higher levels of income. This characterization of family exchange 
contract seems important with regard to the determination of the intrinsic motives for inter 
vivos transfers. In order to find whether private redistributive behavior between generations 
are consistent with altruism or with exchange according to the data, various empirical works 
completed to date have focused on the sign of the relationship between the recipient's income 
and the transfer amount bestowed by parents. We show here that such a test provides little 
information concerning the family motives, at least until the implemented specifications 
neglect both the possibility of non-linearities for the child's income and the donor's attitudes 
towards risk. Anyway, theoretical analyses on the topic are unanimous to recognize that one 
meets with difficulties to infer the motives for inter -vivos transfers inside the families (see 
the discussion in Laferrère and Wolff, 2002).Indeed, the other tests which have been proposed 
in the literature seem hardly more convincing. On the one hand, the unitary difference in 
transfer-income derivatives predicted by the beckerian model does not necessarily hold when 
the parent is altruistic. For example, the derivative restriction fails to hold in a dynamic setting 
when an altruistic parent uses observations on his child's current income to update his 
expectations about future income (McGarry, 2000). On the other hand, attempts to estimate 
the sign of the correlation between services and financial transfers also convey few 
information about transfer motives. A positive pattern is of course expected under exchange, 
but it is also consistent with an altruistic behavior (see Cox, 1996). In particular, it might be 
that altruism is determined endogenously by attention and visits between the two generations 
as suggested by Becker and Murphy (1988) .From an empirical viewpoint, there is also a 
problem with studies that seek to examine the correlation between upstream time-intensive 
services rather than relying on contact and visits which have no market substitutes (Altonji et 
alii, 2000). Indeed, the availability of substitutes strongly affects the theoretical properties of 
the money-services exchange model (Cox, 1987). 
      Finally, our theoretical results point out that caution should be used when drawing 
conclusions from previous empirical studies that have examined the sign of the effect of the 
recipient's income on the transfer amount. Nevertheless, we suggest that the ability to 
distinguish between the two explanations is perhaps not so severely limited. Empirical 
specifications should be refined in two directions, by including the parental degree of risk-
aversion and by allowing for a non-linear relationship between the child's income and the gift 
value received from parents. These two key factors, which have been largely neglected to date 
in empirical analyses of family redistribution behavior, may probably explain why the 
exchange-transfer motive has received so little support. In developing countries, the 
introduction of non-linearities has proved especially fruitful in explaining family transfer 
behavior (Cox et alii, 1998, 2000). It is certainly prematurate to close the door to the exchange 
hypothesis in developed countries without further empirical evidence that control jointly for 
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